Research Brief on Transnational Organized Crime

Special Points of Interest

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United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime

UNODC
Research

1. Transnational organized crime is today a global phenomenon that threatens the security and prosperity of nations, operating through a complex web of visible and invisible structures, in illegal and legal environments

The multitude of actors
involved or connected with organized crime



Transnational organized crime encompasses all serious profit-motivated criminal actions committed by a group to obtain a direct or indirect financial or other material benefit, conducted across national borders. Transnational organized crime has emerged as one of the most complex and rapidly evolving threats facing Member States today, and its evolution reflects broader developments, with globalization, digital transformation and rising geopolitical volatility contributing to the spread and growing sophistication of criminal networks.

Transnational organized crime weakens the rule of law and the capacity of the State, and is a driver and sustainer of conflict, exacerbating harms in conflict situations and undermining international peace and security as well as development. It also seriously harms the environment and the economy, with people as the ultimate victims.

The global manifestations of organized crime have diversified significantly and are today characterized by a wide range of actors that operate with different aims, means and labels, that include mafia, gangs, militias, cults, vigilante groups, "*cartels*", syndicates, and drug trafficking organizations. In some cases, rebels, insurgents, terrorist organizations and armed groups in conflict settings have adopted organized criminal practices, further blurring the boundaries between criminal enterprise and geopolitical agendas.

While some organized criminal groups like street gangs primarily operate locally, others have branches and connections that span across continents, such as the drug trafficking organization *Kompania Bello* that operates across Latin America, Western Europe and South-Eastern Europe. Some groups like *Cosa Nostra* are centralized and hierarchical, while others maintain a more flexible, horizontal structure, as is the case, for example, for several cybercrime networks operating out of West Africa.

In their pursuit of illicit profits, organized criminal groups often rely on professionals and brokers who provide specialized financial, legal or operational services and help organized criminal groups to connect and to infiltrate the legal economy. Within the supply chain of mineral crimes, for example, there are brokers who help to secure agreements between organized criminal groups and government officials over land use permits. Further downstream in the supply chain there are also professionals who purchase illegally sourced gold for wholesale distribution and laundering into legal markets.

While some organized criminal actors operate entirely in illegal environments, others conceal their activities behind legitimate fronts. For example, groups involved in trafficking in persons for forced labour may operate under the cover of legal recruitment agencies, while some groups running industrial-scale scam centres claim to be IT companies. Legitimate and formally licensed businesses may also knowingly or unwittingly participate in illegal market operations (such as the laundering of illegally harvested or produced goods).

Organized crime today it is part of a large and increasingly complex network of criminal activities that involve multiple actors. Actors of diverse nature, status and goals cooperate along shared illegal supply chains, producing and moving goods, laundering profits or providing services.

Organized crime is particularly adept at exploiting legal loopholes and weak law enforcement across countries and may operate at the margins of legal and illegal spaces, posing challenges for criminal justice responses. In the Sahel, for example, fuel smuggling is operated by organized criminal groups with links to prominent individuals in retail fuel companies, financial institutions and corrupt law enforcement officials. In certain areas in South-East Asia, the rapid expansion of the casino industry has resulted in an intricate layer of technical, financial and licensed service providers who launder the illicit proceeds of organized criminal groups, making it difficult to disentangle legal and illegal activities.

Participants in the organization of different trafficking supply chains may operate with much autonomy in different parts of the trafficking process, for instance, facilitating a certain border crossing, counterfeiting documents or logistics. Brokers exploit business contacts and corrupt relationships as trafficking networks form along the trade chain.

2. Organized criminal groups exploit and fuel geopolitical conflicts

Armed conflicts can disrupt illicit markets, but they can also offer fertile ground for organized crime to expand. After the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, for example, some traditional drug trafficking routes were disrupted while online fraud operations increased significantly.

Organized crime often exacerbates geopolitical tensions, because it can provide financial resources to conflicting parties and delay conflict resolution. In the Sahel for instance, illicitly smuggled fuel is sold to armed groups, and in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed groups profit from gold mined inside the country and smuggled abroad. More generally, organized crime contributes to conflict by fuelling corruption and eroding trust in governments. But organized criminal activity can also act as a trigger of conflict. In the Sahel, for instance, violence has repeatedly flared up over competition for control of trafficking routes, while competition for control over illegal gold mining sites has fuelled armed conflict in parts of Africa, South-East Asia and Latin America.

By contributing to an enabling environment for violence and conflict, exacerbating societal tensions, and potentially driving instability and violence, some forms of trafficking, such as firearms trafficking, drug trafficking and trafficking in persons correlate with armed conflict more than others. For instance, areas of armed conflict often become both destinations and sources of illicit firearms flows, while armed conflict dynamics have shaped the global supply of certain drugs, such as methamphetamine produced in South-East Asia and captagon in the Middle East.

In conflict settings, the large numbers of displaced people are particularly vulnerable to falling victim to trafficking in persons. Militias and armed groups around the world have trafficked people for many forms of exploitation, from forced labour to sexual exploitation and forced marriage or as combatants. For example, in 2023, it was estimated that more than 86 armed groups active in Africa recruited children to support their operations.

Factors increasing vulnerability to Trafficking in persons in armed conflicts



Organized crime and armed groups in South-East Asia

3. Unlike armed groups that draw international attention, organized criminal groups often seize control of territories while operating in the shadows. Yet the consequences of criminal governance can be similarly devastating for affected communities

Organized criminal groups often establish and enforce alternative rules to those of the State and can infiltrate the fabric of societies, from local neighborhoods to national institutions. Not all organized criminal groups engage in criminal governance, but those that do pose a significant threat to the rule of law, democratic institutions, and citizens' human rights. These groups typically seek to position themselves as an alternative source of authority over both illegal and legal markets, as well as citizen's everyday lives.

No country, institution or community is immune to the threat posed by groups engaging in criminal governance, which has been documented in low-, middle-, and high-income countries. In some areas of Latin America, criminal governance is highly visible and enforced in broad daylight, but in other parts of the world, organized criminal groups may control territory in less visible ways, but nonetheless significantly affect the lives of the communities under their control.

Organized criminal groups typically assert control over communities through coercion, by using violence and instilling fear, and through cooperation, by providing certain basic services, including control of petty crime and the provision of jobs.

Where organized criminal groups exert territorial control, the illicit economies they foster may also create short-term economic opportunities and help to legitimize their activities among local communities. But the long-term costs for society can be substantial, as illicit economies typically exploit public resources for the private gain of a few, as in the case of illegal mining in the Sahel, which is providing some immediate relief to local communities, but undermining public benefits. These situations give rise to the need for more comprehensive government interventions targeted at both restoring the rule of law and addressing economic needs.

While exercising criminal governance, organized criminal groups can violate human rights, for instance through forced labour. Through extortion rackets they can also harm the private sector, discourage sustainable investment and distort local markets. Illegal economies can drive up real estate prices, making assets less accessible to local communities and exacerbating social and economic inequalities. Control over a territory provides not only a consistent income stream through extortion and a way to cement a power base, but also a platform for expanding into new illicit activities.

Conversely, groups that prioritize control over illegal markets, rather than territorial dominance, may still impose forms of criminal governance to safeguard and facilitate their trafficking operations. For example, some transnational drug trafficking organizations have strategically taken control of key infrastructure hubs and seaports along the cocaine supply chain from South America to Europe, also via West Africa, enabling them to dominate both the legal and illegal trade.

The threat of criminal governance can also extend directly into State institutions. For example, evidence from multiple countries shows that prisons can be highly vulnerable spaces where organized criminal groups can consolidate and project their power beyond prison walls.

4. The trafficking of goods and services remains among the most profitable businesses for organized criminal groups, who can shift seamlessly between different illegal markets to maximize opportunities

Trafficking of goods and services remains the lifeblood of organized criminal groups across the world. The range of goods and services trafficked by organized criminal groups continues to evolve, often driven by gaps between demand and the availability of legal, regulated supply or by the comparative ease and profitability of unregulated markets. While certain forms of trafficking, such as in drugs, trafficking in firearms and trafficking in persons, have remained consistently lucrative for decades, the profitability of other types of trafficking has fluctuated in response to shifting economic and political conditions.

For instance, fuel trafficking surged in the Sahel when disparities in fuel subsidies among different countries created lucrative opportunities. In other parts of the world, international sanctions have triggered new trafficking operations. Illicit gold trafficking has in turn intensified during periods of rising global gold prices, while the illicit trade in rosewood has adapted over time by targeting different species to meet persistent demand, despite increasing international protections. These trends highlight the adaptability of organized crime in operating across illegal markets, exploiting regulatory gaps and market dynamics.

Drug trafficking (where global demand continues to increase), however, remains at the core of transnational organized crime, and continues to provide a major source of income for criminal groups worldwide. The drug trade today is mostly characterized by fragmented supply chains in which groups specialize in distinct stages of the supply chain, from cultivation to retail, relying on fluid and often transactional business partnerships. This decentralization has expanded the role of small and medium-sized groups and service providers, particularly in logistics operations.

In many different types of trafficking, from drugs to wildlife and from fuel to firearms trafficking, it is rare that one single organized criminal group controls the entire supply chain from origin to destination markets. Instead, criminal groups that operate at different stages of the supply chain establish beneficial partnerships.

Illegal trading roles vary according to illegal market dynamics and the engagement and influence of different actors along the trade chain. Some groups may act as local consolidators of illegally sourced goods before onward sale or export. Other groups may handle import, brokering or storage. Further downstream, there may be specialist wholesale and retail dealers, who have limited insight into supply-side dynamics.

Illicit supply chains are not always operated only by members of organized criminal groups. For example, in the trafficking of plant-based drugs, such as cocaine, cultivation of coca leaves is typically done in remote rural areas where local people find income opportunities from involvement in illegal cultivation, with little or no connection to an organized criminal structure. Similarly, people involved in the retail selling of drugs may operate at individual level, handling relatively small quantities and with no direct linkages to organized criminal structures. Illegally sourced natural resources, such as gold, timber or wildlife, may also end up in the legal supply chain and be sold, knowingly or unknowingly, at retail level by legitimate businesses.



Source: UNODC, Global Report on Cocaine 2023 – Local dynamics, global challenges.

Global trends in selected illegal markets

A. Drug markets: available data on production, trafficking and drug use all point to a continued expansion of global drug markets

FIG. 1 Illicit coca cultivation and cocaine production, 2005–2023

FIG. 2 Global opium poppy cultivation and production of opium, 1998–2024



Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2025.

FIG. 3 Trends in quantity of drugs seized, 1998–2023



Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2025.

Note: ATS refers to Amphetamine-type stimulants. Trends are indexed to the baseline year (1998).

FIG. 4 Global number of people who use drugs and prevalence of drug use, 2013, 2018 and 2023



Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2025.

B. Trafficking in persons: the total number of victims of trafficking detected globally has been increasing steadily, apart from a brief reduction in the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic (2020).

FIG. 5 Global trend in detection rates of trafficking victims, by age group and sex, 2003–2022 (per 100,000 population)



Source: UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2024.

C. Wildlife trafficking: Wildlife trafficking persists worldwide despite two decades of concerted action at international and national levels.

FIG. 6 Trends in the standardized seizure index for all seizures and separately for plants and animals 2015–2021



Source: UNODC, World Wildlife Crime Report 2024.

5. New technologies have amplified the speed, reach and operational capacity of organized crime, enabling criminal groups to target victims across borders and to launder criminal profits more effectively

Technological developments have enabled criminal organizations to target victims remotely, creating a clear separation between the jurisdictions in which offenders operate and those in which victims are located. Removing the traditional co-location of perpetrator and victims has reshaped the geography of crime and changed the situational opportunities for both crime committing and prevention.

Frauds and scams have always existed, but technological developments have made them more pervasive and easier to perpetrate. Online frauds and scams facilitated by online technologies have morphed into a multibillion enterprise for large criminal organizations operating out of South-East Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa, among others, where some groups have established formidable physical and online infrastructures that can target victims anywhere in the world. In many instances, online frauds and scams are now perpetrated through the use of Artificial Intelligence tools that help perpetrators more effectively deceive victims – whether they are individuals or businesses.

Organized criminal groups have traditionally been involved in illicit gambling, but the rapid expansion of this sector online has allowed them to tap into a much larger market. Advances in internet speed, mobile apps and other technological innovations have brought gambling to legal and illegal mass markets, which has fuelled an unprecedented demand for professional money-laundering providers, used not only by gambling operators but also by organized criminal groups in other illicit markets. The rapid expansion of the casino industry in the Mekong region is an example of how the global money-laundering scene has rapidly evolved, offering increasingly professionalized services to transnational organized crime.

In addition, organized criminal groups have exploited the global growth of virtual asset markets to move funds internationally, while disguising their illicit origins. Some groups operating in this field now provide end-to-end services to other organized criminal groups, covering the entire money-laundering cycle.

Technology

connects perpetrators, clients and victims in multiple locations



The global harm of organized crime remains high, although much of it is hidden, not directly measured and not fully understood

Organized crime violence

is just the tip of the iceberg



Lethal and non-lethal violence and violations of human rights

Drug and firearms trafficking, migrant smuggling, environmental crimes, counterfeit, cybercrimes, restricting access to basic services, undermining of democratic insitutions, and slowing of development progress

6. Organized crime has killed around the same numbers of people as armed conflict

While violence is often the most visible manifestation of organized crime, the absence of violence does not necessarily indicate the absence of organized crime. In fact, some organized criminal groups operate in countries with low homicide rates and some groups manage to control violence in the areas where they engage in illicit trade so as not to attract attention. But when organized criminal groups do use violence, they can devastate entire communities, spread fear and undermine public safety and social cohesion.

Quantifying the global impact of violence caused by organized criminal groups remains challenging due to limited data. However, a rough estimate indicates that, since the adoption of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) in 2000, organized crime has killed about as many people as armed conflict annually. Between 2000 and 2023, organized criminal groups were responsible for approximately 95,000 homicides per year – slightly more than the annual number of deaths caused by armed conflicts (92,000 victims).

Latin America and the Caribbean, a region visibly impacted by organized crime and gang-related violence, continues to have the highest homicide rate globally, at 19.7 victims per 100,000 population in 2023. Sub-Saharan Africa had an estimated 11.9 victims per 100,000 population in 2023, although the lack of data in this region makes this figure uncertain. In 2023, these two regions together accounted for almost two thirds of all victims of intentional homicide worldwide.

Organized criminal groups use violence against three types of targets: the community, rival groups and the State. Perhaps the most visible form of violence against the community occurs when exposed members of civil society are targeted. For example, in the period 2020–2022, about 200 journalists were killed globally, 20 per cent of whom were killed in connection to reporting on crime. Local businesses are another segment of the community that is particularly exposed to violence by organized criminal groups. Extortion of local businesses remains a secure and stable income source for organized criminal groups and can take the form of compelling businesses to purchase goods, services or labour at rates above market value. Non-compliant businesses face threats, violence or destruction of assets.

Violence against rival groups is typically driven by competition for control over territory and illicit markets, which can lead to rapid and substantial increases in intentional homicides in contested areas. Violence against the State is typically reflected in the targeted killings of public officials, members of the judiciary, politicians and other institutions or the destruction of government infrastructure. The coordinated attacks by armed criminal gangs on police stations and other critical government institutions in Haiti in 2024 illustrates the magnitude of the threat that organized criminal violence against the State can take.

Targets of organized crime violence

1

Against communities and civil society

2

Against other criminal groups

3

Against state actors and institutions

Levels and trends of criminal and other intentional killings since the UNTOC was adopted in 2000

Criminal violence has declined globally since 2000, but with significant variation between regions and countries.

FIG. 7 Victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 population globally and by region, 2000, 2010, 2020, and 2023



Source: Estimates are based on UNODC homicide statistics. Regional estimates for some years and regions are not available due to limited data coverage. Regions are ordered according to their estimated homicide rates in 2023.

Since 2000, globally organized crime has killed about the same number of people as armed conflict.

Average yearly number of armed conflict killings 2000-2023

~ 92,000

deaths

Average yearly number of organized crime killings 2000-2023

~ 95,000

deaths

Sources: Homicide estimates are based on UNODC homicide statistics. Conflict death estimates are from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset and include deaths from state-based violence, non-state violence, and one-sided violence.

Globally, about 22 per cent of intentional homicides are caused by organized criminal groups. In the Americas, organized crime-related homicides represent around 50 per cent of all homicides.

FIG. 8 Share of homicides by type, global and regional, 2021 (or latest year available)

Source: UNODC homicide statistics.

Note: Data are from 108 countries that reported at least one data point on a homicide type. Missing values for homicide types are set to zero and the difference between reported total homicides and reported homicide types is assigned to the unknown homicide category. The lower bound share refers to the proportion of a reported homicide type over the total reported homicides. The best estimate share refers to the proportion of a reported homicide type over the sum of all reported homicide types (excluding the unknown homicides). The upper bound share refers to the proportion of the sum of a reported homicide type plus the unknown homicides over the total reported homicides. Unknown homicides are "re-assigned" at the regional level rather than the country level. Regional shares are computed by using the simple average shares of countries with data for countries without data. The global share refers to the average national shares weighted by the number of estimated homicides in each country for the year 2021. The total is not equal to 100 per cent due to rounding.

Globally, intentional homicide accounts for many more deaths than conflict-related killings and terrorist killings combined.

Average annual number of deaths

caused by homicide, organized crime-related homicide, terrorism and armed conflict, 2000–2023



Sources: Estimates are based on UNODC homicide statistics. Conflict death estimates are from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset and include deaths from state-based violence, non-state violence, and one-sided violence. Terrorist killings estimates are from the Global Terrorism Database. Data on terrorist killings for the years 2021-2023 are not available.

Note: Death as a result of terrorist activities is counted as intentional homicide (ICCS). International datasets on conflict deaths and terrorism, on the one hand, and UNODC homicide statistics, on the other, have a certain degree of overlap. The same killing may meet the ICCS criteria, the criteria of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) database and those of the Global Terrorism Database.

7. The pernicious impact of organized crime on the economy and development

Vicious Circle

of organized crime and development



Quantifying the impact of organized crime on economic development is challenging, but research on illicit economies has shown that it can distort the legal economy and undermine investment and sustainable growth. Proceeds derived from illicit activities provide organized criminal groups with significant financial leverage over local State institutions, enabling them to infiltrate and distort the functioning of key institutions.

Furthermore, organized criminal groups can penetrate the legal economy through illegal means, for example by exerting influence over public administrations to unlawfully obtain public subsidies. Together with extortion rackets, these practices distort market competition and can drive up the costs of basic goods and services. At national level, illegal markets may make up a substantial part of the economy. For example, in some countries in Latin America, illicit financial flows generated by cocaine trafficking are estimated to be comparable to the value of national agricultural exports.

The economic impact of organized crime is also evident in the unequal distribution of public resources. Many forms of crimes that affect the environment, from wildlife crime to mineral and forest crimes, deprive governments of revenue from legal activities such as timber licences, export fees and taxation that could instead be used for public expenditure. The annual fiscal loss resulting from the illegal extraction and trafficking of gold in one country in West Africa was estimated to exceed its annual national expenditure on public health.

8. Organized crime has a negative impact social and environmental development

FIG. 9 Deaths attributable to the use of drugs, 1991–2021



FIG. 10 Healthy years of life lost due to disability and premature death, or disability-adjusted life years (DALYS), attributable to the use of drugs, 1991–2021



Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2025.

The activities of organized criminal groups related to crimes that affect the environment are the most vivid example of how these organizations have a direct negative impact on the health of ecosystems and individuals, from the loss of biodiversity due to wildlife and forest crimes, to the pollution of the air and water in communities where minerals are illegally extracted and processed.

Globally, the use of illicit drugs is estimated to lead to millions of premature deaths and healthy years of life lost due to disability every year. Drug trafficking also has the potential to severely undermine healthcare systems, especially in low-income countries. For instance, in the Pacific Islands, methamphetamine use is straining public healthcare systems, reflected in rising hospital admissions for drug-induced psychosis. The rapidly expanding drug market in the Pacific region has resulted in numerous adverse health impacts on local communities, including an increase in the number of new HIV cases.

9. Organized crime undermines human rights

FIG. 11 Average number of traffickers, average number of victims and average duration of traffickers' activity per single case, by type of criminal actor



Source: UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2020.

Organized criminal groups affect the daily lives of all those living in the territories where they operate, undermining public safety and threatening people's fundamental freedoms.

For instance, the recruitment, segregation and exploitation of victims of human trafficking result in the violation of the right to freedom from slavery, the right to self-determination and the right to safe and fair working conditions. When structured organized criminal groups engage in human trafficking, they traffic more people than non-organized traffickers, for longer durations and in more violent ways.

Communities affected by organized crime often face systematic threats to their human rights from the right to life and personal security to the right to freedom of expression and association. In territories where journalists, community leaders, and human rights defenders are targeted or killed for exposing the activities of organized crime, civic space shrinks, and public trust may be eroded by fear. Organized crime also weakens justice systems and public institutions, undermining the independence and effectiveness of justice systems, often through corruption, intimidation, and collusion, which compromise fair trial guarantees, erode public trust, and enable impunity.

10. Organized crime is driving the convergence of criminal activities in several geographical areas with negative consequences for the affected communities

Unlike the highly visible territorial disputes characterizing today's armed conflicts, organized crime has taken control of certain geographic areas without attracting much attention. By exploiting governance challenges, poor socio-economic conditions and favourable geographical location for illicit trade, organized criminal groups have turned some areas into fertile grounds for a variety of criminal interests and exploitation.

For instance, the convergence of criminal interests is evident in some parts of Latin America, where drug trafficking proceeds are used by organized criminal groups to further exploit the territories under their control through land speculation, illegal logging, illicit mining and wildlife crime, creating growing risks for the ecosystem – a process that has been described as "narco-deforestation". Trafficking in persons for forced labour has also been documented in these contexts.

In some parts of Africa, armed groups recruit children to extract gold and cooperate with organized criminal groups to smuggle these minerals across national borders into international legal markets. Legitimate businesses, militias, small and large organized criminal groups all profit from this system, in the process exploiting thousands of children in the gold mines.

In the so-called "Golden Triangle" in South East Asia, organized criminal groups have exploited weak jurisdictions, typically border zones, special economic zones and territories controlled by armed groups, to set up industrial scale online scam compounds where victims of trafficking are coerced to operate, have established casinos and are operating sophisticated money-laundering schemes to diversify the criminal economy in territories more typically dominated by drug production and trafficking.

10 Action Points

Emerging from 25 years of the implementation of the UNTOC

Tackling transnational organized crime requires evidence-based responses

1. The collection and analysis of reliable data, including concrete cases of international cooperation under UNTOC, is key to informing effective and impactful normative and policy responses to transnational organized crime.
2. Evidence-based and effective responses to organized crime, while being States' primary responsibility, require the engagement of all sectors of society, including civil society organizations, academia, and the private sector.

Tackling transnational organized crime requires context-specific responses

3. Policy and normative responses must be tailored to local contexts, grounded in evidence and informed by community needs.
4. Mainstreaming gender and human rights considerations into policies, laws and strategies enhances the effectiveness and legitimacy of responses to organized crime.

Tackling transnational organized crime requires cooperation within and across borders

5. Criminal justice systems alone cannot effectively dismantle organized crime. It remains imperative that normative and policy responses also address the economic and social conditions that enable transnational organized crime to thrive.
6. Tackling transnational organized crime cannot be done by one State alone. Implementing UNTOC consistently and effectively enables countries to seek legal assistance, extradition, transfer of criminal proceedings, and cooperation for the purposes of confiscation of proceeds of crime, among other forms of cooperation.
7. UNTOC strengthens institutional frameworks for international cooperation through the establishment and empowerment of central authorities.

UNTOC remains the main global tool for tackling organized crime and protecting victims

8. UNTOC has served as a precedent and key reference for the negotiation and finalization of international cooperation provisions in other international criminal law instruments such as the UN Conventions against Corruption and Cybercrime.
9. UNTOC is a flexible instrument containing provisions designed to remain relevant over time.
10. Efforts should be made to encourage synergies between UNTOC and other international instruments, including conventions and instruments on corruption, cybercrime, and terrorism.

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